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Courts Rule Too Narrowly Regarding the Right to
Wear Religious Clothing in Public
Kendyl L. Green*
ABSTRACT
For numerous years, state and institutional rules have barred
individuals from wearing religious clothing. Specifically, this issue has
arisen in the military, the workplace, police departments, prisons, and
public schools. Clothing communicates information about one’s country of
origin, religion, and sexual desires. As discussed below, wearing religious
clothing is a vital aspect of Judaism, Islam, and Sikhism. For instance,
head coverings, including yarmulkes, hijabs, and turbans, are essential in
the eyes of some observers. Traditionally, more observant individuals may
desire to wear religious clothing everyday. The United States Constitution
upholds this religious liberty in the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Additionally, the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) statutes also protect religious
freedom. Cases are examined that upheld religious freedom by making
accommodations as well as others that, unfortunately, denied religious
freedom to individuals. Because religious clothing is crucial to observers
of Judaism, Islam, and Sikhism, courts should broadly construe the laws to
encourage religious accommodations in public environments where a state
or institutional law bars an adherent from following his or her religion,
unless granting the accommodation would cause harm to other individuals.

I. INTRODUCTION
State or institutional rules barring an individual from wearing religious
clothing have been a source of controversy for many years. Specifically,
this issue arises in the military, the workplace, police departments, prisons,
and public schools. Wearing religious clothing is a vital aspect of many
religions, specifically, Judaism, Islam, and Sikhism. The United States
Constitution does not prohibit religious clothing because it would violate
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the First and Fourteenth Amendments.1 Additionally, the Religious
Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) also protect religious freedom.2 Some courts have upheld
religious freedom by making accommodations, which is seen in the Singh
v. McHugh, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch, EEOC v. Autozone, J.B. Hunt
Transport Services, and Holt v. Hobbs cases.3 Unfortunately, some courts
have placed limits on religious accommodations, which is analyzed below
in Goldman v. Weinberger, Webb v. City of Philadelphia, Riback v. L.V.
Metro. Police Dept., Khatib v. County of Orange, United States v. Bd. of
Educ., and Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 4J.4 Because religious clothing
is crucial to observers of Judaism, Islam, and Sikhism, courts should
broadly construe the laws to encourage religious accommodations in public
environments where a state or institutional law bars an adherent from
following his or her religion, unless granting the accommodation would
cause harm to other individuals.

II. HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS CLOTHING IN JUDAISM, ISLAM,
AND SIKHISM
Religious apparel is a part of observing Judaism, Islam, and Sikhism,
among other religions. Clothing is used as a form of nonverbal
communication in two manners: “clothing as self-definition and clothing as
a reflection of societal roles and perceptions.”5 Clothing may “nonverbally
communicate information about individuals, the nature of their
interpersonal relationships, and the overall context in which interpersonal
interactions occur.”6 Before any verbal exchanges, clothing allows
individuals [to] project information about their sex, age, country of origin,
religion, sexual desires, and socioeconomic class prior to any verbal

1. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2012); Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L.
No. 103-141, § 3, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012)). The Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991).
3. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015); Holt v. Hobbs, 135
S. Ct. 853 (2015); Singh v. McHugh, 185 F. Supp. 3d 201 (D.D.C. 2016); EEOC v.
Autozone, No. 10-11648, slip op. at 1 (D. Mass. Mar. 29, 2013); J.B. Hunt Transport Settles
EEOC Religious Discrimination Charge for $260,000, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release.
4. Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986); Khatib v. County of Orange, 639
F.3d. 898 (9th Cir. 2011); Webb v. City of Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2009);
United States v. Bd. of Educ. for Sch. Dist., 911 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1990); Cooper v. Eugene
Sch. Dist. No. 4J, 723 P.2d 298 (Or. 1968); Riback v. L.V. Met. Pol. Dept., No. 2:07-cv1152-RLH-LRL, 2008 WL 3211279, at *1 (D. Nev. Aug. 6, 2008).
5. Debra Reece, Covering and Communication: The Symbolism of Dress among
Muslim Women, 7 HOW. J. COMM. 35 (1996) (discussing the meaning and various types of
veils Muslim women may wear to uphold the cultural and religious customs in Islam).
6. Id. at 36.
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exchange.7 Many religions, including Judaism, Islam, and Sikhism,
incorporate headgear, which visibly indicates religious affinity and
sometimes national origin.8 The more important religion is to an
individual, the more he or she may want to express religion through dress.9
Specifically, in Judaism, the Bible presents a woman’s hair as an
ornament that enhances her appearance.10 Because “a woman’s hair is
considered ervah, or erotic stimulus, [it] must therefore be covered.”11 As
a way for women to visibly express their observance of the laws of Judaism
and the Torah, some women choose to practice veiling “to fulfill [their]
obligation to serve as ‘redeemer of the Jewish people.’”12 The Torah
specifies that a married woman must “wear a head-covering that hides all
her hair from view.”13 Today, “women who obey these laws ascribe
various meanings to the act of head-covering: it is a sign of marriage, or of
identification with the tribe; a symbol of piety and humility; an act of
deference to the Divine Will; [and] a sign of sexual modesty.”14 There are
different ways to veil oneself, including wearing a scarf (tichel), a wig
(sheitel), a hat, or a net to cover up a woman’s natural hair.15
Additionally, it is stated in the Bible that men must cover their heads.16
Rabbi Joseph Karo’s sixteenth century Jewish law code, Shulhan Arukh,
rules that a man may not walk more than four cubits be-gilui rosh, with his
head uncovered.”17 This is based on the “Talmudic passage in Tractate
Kiddushin 31a, which state[s]: It is forbidden for a man to walk four amos
with an upright posture.”18 Covering one’s head demonstrates piety and,
additionally separates Jews from Gentiles.19 Christians bare their heads as
a sign of respect, but for Jewish people, exposing one’s head would violate
the hukkot hagoyim, or customs of the nations.20 Therefore, yarmulkes, or
head coverings, remain a crucial cultural and religious aspect of Judaism.

7. Reece, supra note 5 at 68.
8. Michael Newman & Faith Isenhath, Use Your Head! Title VII Provides for
Reasonable Accommodation for Religious Headwear, 56 FED. L. 14 (2009) (discussing the
importance of headwear in religious practice).
9. Reece, supra note 5, at 37.
10. Leila Bronner, From Veil to Wig: Jewish Women’s Hair Covering, 42 JUDAISM: A
Q. J. OF JEWISH LIFE & THOUGHT 4 (1993).
11. Reorienting the Veil, UNC CENTER FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES, https://veil.unc.edu/r
eligions/judaism.
12. Reorienting the Veil, supra note 11.
13. Id.
14. Susan Weiss, Demystification of Women’s Head Covering in Jewish Law, 17
NASHIM: A JRN’L JEWISH WOMEN’S STUD. & GENDER ISSUES 89 (2009).
15. Richard Freund, The Veiling of Women in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, UNIV.
OF HARTFORD MAURICE GREENBERG CENTER FOR JUDAIC STUDIES (2011).
16. Dan Rabinowitz, Yarmulke: A Historic Cover-Up?, HAKIRAH, THE FLATBRUSH J. OF
JEWISH L. AND THOUGHT 221, 223 (2007).
17. Id. at 223.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 224.
20. ALEX BEIN, THE JEWISH QUESTION: BIOGRAPHY OF A WORLD PROBLEM 489 (1990).
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Like Judaism, Islam also requires specific clothes for observers.
Clothing has been tied to purity or impurity and modesty or immodesty,
and serves to differentiate the believers from the nonbelievers.21 Also,
clothing distinguishes the men from the women.22 Some Muslims believe a
woman must cover her body “from a man with whom she is not mahram
[or cannot marry] and that she should not flaunt herself or put her body on
display in society. She is asked not to stimulate the attention of men by
any means.”23 As a result, many women wear a veil.24 A veil varies
tremendously, but may include “covering the entire face with a translucent
piece of cloth; covering most of the face except for the eyes in a mask-like
appearance; and covering the head, concealing the hair and neck.” Each of
these definitions assumes the covering of the head, neck, and bosom with a
loose outer garment.25
Wearing a hijab, commonly known as a veil, is a manner in which a
woman may remain modest under the law of the Quran.26 The term hijab
“has a three-dimensional nature, including the visual, hiding something
from sight; the spatial, separating and establishing boundaries; and the
ethical, stating that something is forbidden.”27 The pivotal event in the
Quran to invoke a hijab involved “the lowering of a curtain to protect the
intimacy of Muhammad and his wife, and to exclude one of Muhammad’s
male companions.”28 The Quran declares, “Say to the believing women to
cast down their glance and guard their private parts (24:31).”29 The Quran
even goes as far as using the word hijab in its text, stating, “. . . and when
you ask his wives for any object, ask them from behind a curtain (hijab) . . .
(33:53).”30
Clothing serves as a means of nonverbal, symbolic
communication both within the Islamic society and outside of it.31 It plays
a large part in defining social roles constructed by Islam and Muslim

21. Reece, supra note 5, at 38. “The word ‘Islam’ means ‘submission, surrender, and
obedience,’ but as a religion, Islam represents the complete submission to G[-]d.” Aliah
Abdo, The Legal Status of Hijab in the United States: A Look at the Sociopolitical
Influences on the Legal Right to Wear the Muslim Headscarf, 5 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY
L.J. 441, 445 (2008).
22. Id.
23. Murtadha Mutahari, Islamic Hijab Modest Dress (2007).
24. Reece, supra note 5. “The word ‘Islam’ means ‘submission, surrender, and
obedience,’ but as a religion, Islam represents the complete submission to G[-]d.” Aliah
Abdo, The Legal Status of Hijab in the United States: A Look at the Sociopolitical
Influences on the Legal Right to Wear the Muslim Headscarf, 5 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY
L.J. 441, 445 (2008).
25. Id.
26. Mutahari, supra note 23.
27. Reece, supra note 5, at 40.
28. Id. See also Ali Ammoura, Banning the Hijab in Prisons: Violations of
Incarcerated Muslim Women’s Right to Free Exercise of Religion, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
657, 659 (2013).
29. AL-ISLAM.ORG, https://www.al-islam.org (last visited Feb. 13, 2014).
30. Id.
31. Reece, supra note 5, at 40.
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individuals regarding a woman’s role in society.32 Today, many Muslim
women have chosen to wear a head covering that covers only the head and
neck and does not cover the face.33 They find this balances upholding their
religion and culture with blending into society.34
Lastly, Sikhism also mandates that individuals wear head coverings
and specific religious clothing. “Sikhs who have made a public
commitment to the faith by going through a special baptism, known as the
Amrit Ceremony, are called members of the Khalsa (the community of
baptized Sikhs).”35 After going through the ceremony, they adopt five
symbols known as the Five K’s, which show Sikh identity as well as
powerful religious meaning.36 “The Five K’s are the five items of dress
and physical appearance given to the Sikhs by Guru Gobind Singh when he
gathered together the first members of the Khalsa on Baisakhi Day in
1699.”37 The first of the Five K’s is the kesh, or uncut hair and beard to
sustain him or her in higher consciousness and a turban which is the crown
of spirituality.38 Having uncut hair represents a Sikh’s devotion to G-d.39
Second, the kangha, a small wooden comb, represents hygiene and
discipline to groom one’s hair.40 Katchera, the third K, is specially made
cotton underwear to signify purity.41 Fourth, Kara is a steel circle, or
bangle, which is “worn on the wrist, signifying bondage to Truth and
freedom from every other entanglement.”42 Lastly, Kirpan is a sword
which is possessed by the Khalsa to defend the line of truth.43
The Sikh turbans also have specific meanings.44 There are two main
styles including the “‘beaked’ kind worn by those who trace their origins to
the Pothohar area around Rawalpindi and the flatter variety favored by
those who belong to the plains of the Punjab.”45 Individuals “from the
plains tie their turbans in a variety of fashions, [with] the two most popular
being the Patiala Shahi and the Ludhiana styles. The Patiala Shahi has
layers of folded cloth (lar) on both sides of the turban.”46 Conversely, the

32. Reece, supra note 5, at 40.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. The Five K’s, http://www.amritsar.com (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. RELIGION AND THE BODY 296–97 (Sarah Coakley ed., 1st ed. 1997).
39. The Five K’s, supra note 35.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Hew McLeod, The Five Ks of the Khalsa Sikhs, 128 J. AM. ORIENTAL SOC’Y 325
(2008).
45. Id.
46. McLeod, supra note 44. “Sikh women do not normally wear a turban, but certain
sects require it. Prominent amongst these are members of the Akhand Kirtani Jatha and also
the 3HO Sikhs who observe teachings of Yogi Bhajan.” Id.
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Ludhiana style has lar on one side while the other side is plain.47 “The
color of the turban is also significant. Dark blue is worn by followers of the
Akali party or by Nihangs. White designates either a Congress supporter or
an elderly Sikh.”48 Furthermore, saffron colored turbans are worn by
followers of the Khalistani movement and patterned turbans are favored by
Sikhs from southeast Asian countries.49 Because clothing is a significant
religious attribute of Judaism, Islam, and Sikhism, many individuals choose
to uphold these rules.

III. LEGAL SOURCES ADDRESSING
RELIGIOUS GARB RIGHTS
Even though the religious laws of Judaism, Islam, and Sikhism
command individuals to wear clothing or style their physical appearance in
a particular manner, some public institutions in America and state laws do
not permit religious individuals to dress or style their bodies to observe
their religion. As discussed below, some argue wearing head coverings or
styling one’s hair in a particular manner illustrates a statement for a
specific religion, conflicting with the First Amendment and Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.50 The Free Exercise Clause
in the First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”51
Additionally, individuals argue that the Establishment Clause, which
prohibits the government from making any law “respecting an
establishment of religion,” would also be violated if the country permits
people to wear religious clothing or alter their physical appearance to
match a religious rule because it expresses the observance of a particular
religion.52 However, unless granting religious accommodations would be
harmful to others, barring individuals from wearing religious clothing or
altering their physical appearance to abide by the religious rules prohibits
freedom for individuals to practice their religion.53 “Where government
action interferes with or coerces religious practice, challenges are almost
always analyzed under . . . the”54 First Amendment.
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court used the test known as the
“Lemon Test” to establish whether the government had violated the
Establishment Clause.55 To avoid a violation, there must be a significant
47. McLeod, supra note 44
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. I.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Susan Gellman & Susan Looper-Friedman, Thou Shalt Use the Equal Protection
Clause for Religious Cases (Not Just the Establishment Clause), 10 U. PA. J. CONST. 665
(2008).
55. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 91 S. Ct. 2105, 2111 (1971).
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secular purpose, the action must not have the primary effect of advancing
or inhibiting religion, and it does not foster excessive entanglement
between government and religion.56 This test may be applied to other cases
to assess whether a First Amendment violation has occurred. Furthermore,
Americans also believe the Equal Protection Clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment, which states the Constitution cannot “deny any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” and is violated if an
individual is not permitted to wear religious apparel.57 Barring individuals
from wearing religious clothing would violate the Fourteenth Amendment
because it would deny individuals equal protection for the right to freedom
of religion.58
In addition to the United States Constitution, the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) also protects religious freedom. After the
Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, religious
liberty took a setback.59 “Before Smith, the Supreme Court’s free exercise
test had prohibited the government from burdening a person’s religious
exercise unless the government demonstrated that it had a compelling
interest, not achievable by other means, that justified trumping the person’s
religious practice.”60
However, Smith “reversed this traditional
presumption: the government no longer had to show an important reason
for overriding a person’s religious convictions no matter how easy it would
be for the government to accommodate her religious exercise.”61 RFRA
was passed to “restore the ‘compelling interest’ test by once again placing
the burden on the government to demonstrate that a law is compelling and
unachievable by less restrictive means.”62 Generally, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb1 protects religious freedoms, but provides for a narrow exception by
including the compelling interest test.63 The compelling interest test in
section three part (b) declares that the “[g]overnment may substantially
burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that
application of the burden to the person––(1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest.”64 Even though the
statute provides for an exception, the government has a significant standard

56. Id.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
58. Id.
59. Kimberlee Wood Colby, The 20th Anniversary of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 4 J. CHRISTIAN LEGAL THOUGHT 12 (2014).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. “Republican Senator Orrin Hatch and Democratic Senator Ted Kennedy
together led the effort to pass RFRA in the Senate. The Senate passed RFRA by a vote of
97-3, … followed by a unanimous voice vote in the House.” Shortly after, “President
Clinton signed RFRA into law on November 16, 1993.” Id.
63. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, § 3, 107 Stat. 1488 at 1488–89.
64. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, supra note 63.
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to overcome accommodating an individual’s religious needs.65
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits prospective
employers from refusing to hire an applicant in order to avoid
accommodating a religious practice that it could accommodate without
undue hardship.66 Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
amended by Section 107 in 1991 and states, “An unlawful employment
practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice.”67 Congress amended Title VII to include beliefs
and practices by adding a definition of religion. “Religion includes all
aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an
employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate an
employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”68
Therefore, it is a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
not hire a prospective employee merely because of an employee’s desire to
wear religious clothing or have a distinct physical appearance displaying
his or her religion.69
Lastly, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) is a law that also protects individuals’ religious freedom.70 The
Act was codified into 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) which states,
[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious
exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, as
defined in [42 U.S.C. § 1997], even if the burden results from a
rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates
that imposition of the burden on that person (1) is in furtherance of
a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.71
42 U.S.C. § 1997 defines institution as any facility or institution which
is owned, operated, or managed by, or provides services on behalf of, any
State or political subdivision of States, and which is a jail, prison, or other
correctional facility or pretrial detention facility.72 This statute protects the
religious freedom of individuals who are incarcerated or held in holding
cells in court facilities.73

65. Id.
66. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 135 S. Ct. at 2028.
67. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075
(1991).
68. Steven D. Jamar, Accommodating Religion at Work: A Principled Approach to Title
VII and Religious Freedom, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 719, 741–42 (1996).
69. See id.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2012).
71. Id.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (2012).
73. See id.
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IV. COURTS DECIDING WHETHER AN INDIVIDUAL IS
ENTITLED TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
For many years, the court system has decided whether an individual is
entitled to religious liberty when there is a state or institutional rule that
would be violated if they did visibly observe their religion. Too often, the
courts have ruled to uphold the state or institutional rules, barring an
observer from the freedom to practice his or her religion when the
accommodation would not harm others. Specifically, using Singh v.
McHugh and Goldman v. Weinberger, this paper will begin with an
analysis of the courts’ both sympathetic and restrictive rulings in the
military.74 Next, it will discuss the courts’ decisions in EEOC v.
Abercrombie & Fitch, EEOC v. Autozone, and the J.B. Hunt Transport
Services cases to uphold religious freedom in the workplace.75 Thirdly, it
explores the cases Webb v. City of Philadelphia and Riback v. L.V. Metro.
Police Dept., which discuss instances where the court ruled too narrowly
and upheld the restriction barring an officer from having religious freedom
in the police department.76 Fourthly, courts have also ruled both broadly
and narrowly on religious freedom in prisons and holding cells, as we see
in Holt v. Hobbs and Khatib v. County of Orange.77 Lastly, there has been
a great deal of controversy regarding whether a teacher should have
religious freedom when it violates a rule in public schools as well. United
States v. Bd. of Educ., and Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 4J are
examples of where the courts have decided to uphold institution or state
laws and disregard an individual’s right to freedom of religion.78
Unfortunately, because of the way courts have ruled, there are too many
instances where an individual is denied his or her right to observe a
religion.
A. RELIGION IN THE MILITARY
The military has addressed whether it must allow individuals to wear
religious head coverings even if it is against the military rules. The
Goldman v. Weinberger case is about a rabbi, S. Simcha Goldman, who
“brought suit against Secretary of Defense and others, claiming that
application of an Air Force regulation to prevent him from wearing his
yarmulke infringed upon his First Amendment right to free exercise of
religion”79 Goldman contended that the Air Force regulation mandating
uniform dress for Air Force personnel violates the law.80 Goldman

74. Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1310; Singh, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 72.
75. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 135 S. Ct. at 2028; Autozone, slip op. at 1; J.B. Hunt
Transport Settles EEOC Religious Discrimination Charge for $260,000, supra note 3.
76. Webb, 562 F.3d at 258; Riback, 2008 WL 3211279, at *1.
77. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 853; Khatib, 639 F.3d. at 898.
78. Bd. of Educ. for Sch. Dist., 911 F.2d at 882; Cooper, 723 P.2d at 298.
79. Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1311.
80. Id.
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attempted to follow the rules by “wearing a service cap over the yarmulke
while he was outdoors.”81 When he testified as a defense witness at a
court-martial wearing his yarmulke without the service cap covering it, the
opposing counsel put in a complaint arguing that Goldman’s “yarmulke
was a violation of Air Force Regulation (AFR) 35-10. This regulation
states in pertinent part that ‘[headgear] will not be worn . . . [while] indoors
except by armed security police in the performance of their duties.”82
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted
an injunction that enjoined the Air Force from enforcing the rule against
Goldman and from penalizing him for wearing the yarmulke.83 After this
ruling, the defendants appealed and the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed, “on the ground that the Air Force’s strong
interest in discipline justified the strict enforcement of its uniform dress
requirements.”84 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari
and held that Free Exercise Clause in “the First Amendment does not
prohibit the challenged regulation from being applied to petitioner even
though its effect is to restrict the wearing of the headgear required by his
religious beliefs. That Amendment does not require the military to
accommodate . . . wearing a yarmulke” because it is their view that it
would detract from the uniformity of the military.85
Even though the Supreme Court held it would not violate the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, according to the “Lemon Test,” it
is controversial whether all the prongs are fulfilled and no violation exists
for the Establishment Clause.86 To avoid a violation, there must be a
significant secular purpose, the action must not have the primary effect of
advancing or inhibiting religion, and it does not foster excessive
entanglement between government and religion.87 Here, the court finds
significant secular purpose, which is the need to maintain a uniform
military and to “foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit
de corps.”88 Nevertheless, as discussed in the case, armed security police
are permitted to wear hats, so it is difficult to inhibit individuals in
Goldman’s department from wearing hats.89 If the military is concerned
about uniformity, it could provide matching hats as part of the uniform.90
Next, the action must not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion.91 It can be argued that barring individuals from wearing visible

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id. at 1312.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1311.
Lemon, 91 S. Ct. at 2111.
Id.
Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1313.
See id.
See Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1313.
Lemon, 91 S. Ct. at 2111.
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religious gear has the primary effect of inhibiting religion.92 Even though
some may argue wearing religious gear creates a divided Air Force, this is
not a strong argument because the entire outfit the individual wears is the
same and including a matching uniform hat would fulfill the religious head
covering obligation.93 Clearly, the addition of a hat would have no impact
on national security. Lastly, an individual may argue it does not foster
excessive entanglement between government and religion.94 Therefore,
even though the Supreme Court held that the prohibition of wearing a
yarmulke is not a violation of the Free Exercise Clause in the First
Amendment,95 the issue does not clearly satisfy the “Lemon Test” for the
Establishment Clause, which causes it to be a point of controversy.96
Conversely, unlike Goldman v. Weinberger where the Supreme Court
ruled narrowly, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia has ruled more broadly to permit religious freedom in the
military so there is no violation of RFRA.97 In Singh v. McHugh, a Hofstra
University student, Iknoor Singh, sought to enroll in Reserve Officers
Training Corps (ROTC), which is run by the army at his university.98
Singh is a practicing Sikh and wears a beard, does not cut his hair, and
wraps it inside a turban, which violates the Army uniform and grooming
standards.99 “Plaintiff maintains the sincere belief that if he cut his hair,
shaved his beard, or abandoned his turban, he would be ‘dishonoring and
offending God.’”100 He brought an action against the Secretary of the
Army and other officials alleging that the Army violated RFRA because it
failed to accommodate his religious exercise by banning him from wearing
a turban, unshorn hair, and a beard.101 In relevant part, Singh sought a
preliminary injunction requiring the Army to process the accommodation
or provide a preliminary enlistment if the request was denied, a declaratory
judgment that defendants’ refusal to grant plaintiff a religious exemption to
the Army’s grooming and uniform standards violates RFRA, and a
permanent injunction ordering defendants to allow him to join ROTC.102
According to Army Regulation A.R. 600-20, soldiers are permitted “to
wear religious apparel while in uniform, including religious ‘headgear,’ if
the apparel is ‘neat and conservative’ and it will not ‘interfere with the
performance of military duties.’”103 Soldiers may wear religious headgear
if it satisfies the following standards: it is subdued in color; can be covered
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

See id.
See Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1312.
Lemon, 91 S. Ct. at 2111.
Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1311.
Lemon, 91 S. Ct. at 2111.
Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1312; Singh, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 72.
Singh, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 72.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 76.
Id.
Singh, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 77.
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by standard military headgear; has no writing, symbols, or pictures; and
does not interfere with the functioning of protective clothing.104 “Soldiers
are not authorized to wear religious headgear that does not meet these
requirements while in uniform unless they have received a religious
accommodation.”105 The Army grants religious accommodation requests
“unless the accommodation will have an adverse impact on unit readiness,
individual readiness, unit cohesion, morale, good order, discipline, safety,
and/or health.”106 Men’s hair “‘must present a tapered appearance,’ and
when combed, may ‘not fall over the ears or eyebrows, or touch the
collar.”107 However, males “may wear wigs ‘to cover natural baldness or
physical disfiguration’” and women may wear long hair. Also, “men are
required to ‘keep their face[s] clean-shaven when in uniform, or in civilian
clothes on duty.’”108 Mustaches are accepted “as long as they are ‘neatly
trimmed, tapered, and tidy.’”109
The court used the RFRA test to determine whether Singh’s religious
liberty had been violated. The “‘[g]overnment shall not substantially
burden a person’s exercise of religion’ unless it can ‘demonstrate that
application of the burden to the person––(1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest.’”110 Here, the court
determined that the defendants had not shown how accommodating Singh’s
religious preferences would do greater damage to the Army’s compelling
interests in uniformity, discipline, credibility, unit cohesion, and training,”
because the Army already had thousands of individuals with facial hair.111
The Army had also previously made exceptions for Sikhs.112 Lastly, the
defendants had not proven that barring Singh from wearing a turban, beard,
and growing long hair was the least restrictive means of furthering their
interest.113 Therefore, the student’s motion was granted because the Army
did not fulfill its obligation in proving that barring Singh from joining the
ROTC while wearing a beard, turban, and long hair was in furtherance of a
governmental interest and that there was no other less restrictive means to
do so.
B. RELIGIOUS RESTRICTIONS AND ACCOMMODATIONS IN THE WORKPLACE
Many public employment institutions have specific regulations that
inhibit what an individual is permitted to wear. In EEOC v. Abercrombie

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id. at 72.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 102.
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& Fitch, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought
a Title VII action on behalf of a Muslim job applicant against Abercrombie
& Fitch for religious discrimination.114 Abercrombie & Fitch refused to
hire Samantha Elauf, a practicing Muslim, because the headscarf she wore
for religious purposes conflicted with the employee dress policy.115 EEOC
contended that Abercrombie violated Title VII, which “prohibits a
prospective employer from refusing to hire an applicant because of the
applicant’s religious practice when the practice could be accommodated
without undue hardship.”116 The potential employee alleged the retailer
failed to make accommodations for the applicant to wear her headscarf.117
The courts examined whether the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibition “applies only where an applicant has informed the employer of
his need for an accommodation.”118 The United States District Court for
the Northern District of Oklahoma granted EEOC’s motion for summary
judgment as to liability and awarded $20,000 in damages to Elauf.119
Abercrombie & Fitch appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit, which reversed the decision and remanded the case with
instructions on the grounds that “an employer cannot be liable under Title
VII for failing to accommodate a religious practice until the applicant (or
employee) provides the employer with the actual knowledge of his need for
an accommodation.”120
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and held
“that a job applicant seeking to prove a Title VII disparate treatment claim
need only show that the need for a religious accommodation was a
motivating factor in the prospective employer’s adverse decision, and need
not show that the employer actually knew that the applicant’s practice was
a religious practice that required an accommodation.”121 The Title VII
“disparate-treatment provision requires Elauf to show that Abercrombie (1)
‘fail[ed] . . . to hire’ her (2) ‘because of’ (3) ‘[her] religion.’ The “because
of” standard is understood to mean that the protected characteristic cannot
be a ‘motivating factor’ in an employment decision.”122 The Court
contends that part (1) of the test is fulfilled because Abercrombie failed to
hire Elauf.123 Part (3) is satisfied because “the parties concede that . . .
Elauf’s wearing of a headscarf is (3) a ‘religious practice.’”124
The (2) “because of” prong was the point of controversy.125 The Court
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 135 S. Ct. at 2028.
Id. at 2030.
Id.
Id. at 2028.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 135 S. Ct. at 2030.
Id. at 2031.
Id.
Id.
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examined the difference between knowledge and motive to figure out if the
“because of” prong was satisfied.126 “An employer who has actual
knowledge of the need for an accommodation does not violate Title VII by
refusing to hire an applicant if avoiding that accommodation is not his
motive.”127 However, “an employer who acts with the motive of avoiding
accommodation may violate Title VII even if he has no more than an
unsubstantiated suspicion that accommodation would be needed.”128
Therefore, employment decisions should not be made “because of”
applicants’ religious practices.129 An employer may have a no-headwear
policy generally, but “Title VII requires otherwise-neutral policies to give
way to the need for an accommodation.”130
In addition to Muslims facing discrimination in the workplace, Sikhs
are also discriminated against because of their religious traditions.131 In
EEOC v. Autozone, the EEOC brought a civil rights action on behalf of
Mahoney Burroughs against Autozone under the Civil Rights Act of
1964.132 EEOC alleged Autozone managers harassed Burroughs by
“disparaging his religion, asking if he had joined Al-Qaeda, and whether he
was a terrorist.”133 Autozone “failed to intervene when customers referred
to him as ‘Bin Laden’ and made terrorist jokes.”134 The EEOC alleged that
Autozone refused to let Mahoney wear a turban and kara, which is an
obligatory part of Sikhism.135 Because of Autozone’s failure to protect
Burrough’s religious liberty, Autozone violated the Civil Rights Act of
1964.136 The United States District Court, for the Eastern District of
Massachusetts granted summary judgment regarding the settlement.137 The
parties came to a settlement and “in a consent decree approved by this
court, . . . in addition to extensive injunctive relief, Mahoney Burroughs
ought to receive $75,000.00 in monetary relief plus reasonable attorney’s
fees.”138
Similarly to the Autozone case, four Sikh truckers for J.B. Hunt
126. Id. at 2033.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Autozone, slip op. at 1.
132. Id.
133. AUTOZONE, INC. SETTLES FOR $75,000 IN SIKH DISCRIMINATION CASE, https://am
ericanturban.com (last visited Mar. 10, 2017) (discussing religious discrimination where
Burroughs was insulted and taunted merely because he wore a turban and kara for
Sikhism).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. Beyond the monetary relief, there is a decree that “requires Autozone to adopt a
policy prohibiting religious discrimination; train its managers and human resource
employees on religious discrimination and the new policy; report to the EEOC …; distribute
the new policy; and a notice … to it 65,000 employees.”
137. Autozone, slip op. at 1.
138. Id.
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Transport Services were discriminated against in the workplace when J.B.
Hunt insisted that the four Sikhs cut their beards and remove their turbans
for drug testing.139 The four Sikh applicants were denied religious
accommodations during the hiring process when they requested an
alternative to the company’s hair sample drug testing policy along with not
forcing them to remove their turbans during testing.140 It is a horrific
religious violation in Sikhism for individuals to cut their hair or remove
their turbans in public.141 The EEOC investigated the allegations and found
reasonable cause to believe that J.B. Hunt failed to provide a religious
accommodation and failed to hire a class of individuals due to their race,
national origin, and religion, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.142 To avoid litigation, J.B. Hunt agreed to pay the four Sikhs
$260,000 as well as “revise its drug testing policy and take steps to make
its hiring process more inclusive for qualified candidates regardless of race,
national origin or religion.”143
C. RELIGIOUS RESTRICTIONS IN THE POLICE DEPARTMENT
In addition to the military and the workplace, discrimination occurs in
the police force as well. Webb v. City of Philadelphia discussed whether
permitting Kimberlee Webb, a practicing Muslim, to wear a religious
headscarf (Khimar or hijab), while on duty, would pose an undue burden
on the City of Philadelphia.144 “Webb’s headscarf would cover neither her
face nor her ears, but would cover her head and the back of her neck.”145
The request to wear the headscarf was denied because of Philadelphia
Police Directive 78, which “prescribes the approved Philadelphia police
uniforms and equipment. Nothing in Directive 78 authorizes the wearing
of religious symbols or garb as part of the uniform.”146 Webb filed a
complaint for the violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act with
the EEOC and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission.147 During
this time, Webb arrived at work and refused to remove the headscarf and
was sent home for failing to comply with Directive 78.148 She was told that
her “conduct could lead to disciplinary action,” so she reported to work
without a headscarf.149 “Disciplinary charges of insubordination were
subsequently brought against Webb, resulting in a temporary thirteen-day
139. Brian Melley, Sikh Truckers Reach Settlement in Faith Discrimination Case,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 15, 2016, 8:59 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. J.B. Hunt Transport Settles EEOC Religious Discrimination Charge for $260,000,
supra note 3.
143. Id.
144. Webb, 562 F.3d at 258.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Webb, 562 F.3d at 258.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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suspension.”150
In relevant part, Webb brought an action for religious discrimination
under Title VII.151 “The District Court found that Directive 78 and [its]
‘detailed standards with no accommodation for religious symbols and attire
not only promote the needs for uniformity, but also enhance cohesiveness,
cooperation, and the esprit de corps of the police force.’”152 Philadelphia
would suffer an undue hardship if it were forced to permit Webb and other
individuals to wear religious clothing with their uniforms.153 The District
Court held Webb “failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact for the
Title VII religious discrimination” claim.154 Webb appealed this to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. “To establish a prima
facie case of religious discrimination, the employee must show: (1) she
holds a sincere religious belief that conflicts with a job requirement; (2) she
informed her employer of the conflict; and (3) she was disciplined for
failing to comply with the conflicting requirement.”155 After establishing
these factors, the employer must show either “a good-faith effort to
reasonably accommodate the religious belief, or such an accommodation
would work an undue hardship upon the employer.”156 There is an “‘undue
hardship’ if it would impose more than a de minimis cost on the
employer.”157
The Third Circuit held that even though Webb established a case of
religious discrimination, the police department met the burden of
establishing an undue hardship.158 The court agreed with the police
department that it is more important to maintain the “perception of its
impartiality by citizens of all races and religions whom the police are
charged to serve and protect.”159 If Derivative 78 is not strictly enforced,
“the values of impartiality, religious neutrality, uniformity, and the
subordination of personal preference would be severely damaged to the
detriment of the proper functioning of the police department.”160
Therefore, the Third Circuit decided to follow the Directive 78 and bar
individuals from wearing religious clothing while on duty with their police
uniforms.
Riback v. L.V. Met. Pol. Dept. also discussed alleged discrimination of
an individual’s religious freedom in the police. An Orthodox Jewish police
officer who worked for the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 158–59.
Id. at 259.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 260.
Id. at 261.
Id.
Webb, 562 F.3d at 261.
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wanted to wear a yarmulke and a beard to observe his Jewish customs.161
However, “his profession requires that he shave and not wear a hat
indoors.”162 Subsequent to transferring to the police’s Quality Assurance
department, Riback obtained permission to wear a trimmed beard and a
yarmulke.163 “After six weeks, Deputy Chief Ault noticed Riback’s beard”
and ordered for him to conform to the police guidelines.164 Riback
requested that the police make formal religious accommodations for his
beard and yarmulke.165 The police denied his requests on the grounds that
“(1) beards prevent the proper fitting of gas masks, (2) beards provide
additional means for a suspect to gain an advantage when engaged in
combat with an officer, and (3) beards undermine officer uniformity.”166
They also contended that Riback could not wear his yarmulke because
“wearing religious symbols would undermine officer neutrality and erode
public trust.”167 Riback brought this action after the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission granted him the right to sue.168 The
court held a hearing for a preliminary injunction and enjoined the police
department from punishing Riback for wearing a quarter-inch beard, but
did not permit Riback to wear the yarmulke.169 Both parties moved for
summary judgment.170
In relevant part, the court held that the police department violated
Riback’s First Amendment rights in regard to the beard when they
prohibited him from wearing one.171 To reiterate the validity of the court’s
First Amendment finding, the “Lemon Test” can be applied to this situation
and also find an Establishment Clause breach.172 To avoid a violation
under the “Lemon Test,” there must be a significant secular purpose, the
action must not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion,
and it does not foster excessive entanglement between government and
religion.173 The significant secular purpose to oppose permitting a beard
would be to promote uniformity, neutrality, and create a safer atmosphere
in the field.174 However, the action here does have the primary effect of
inhibiting Judaism because the court discusses a case, Employment Div.,
Dep’t. of Human Res. Of Or. v. Smith, that allows an exception for medical

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Riback v. L.V. Met. Pol. Dept., 2008 WL 3211279, at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Lemon, 91 S. Ct. at 2111.
Lemon, 91 S. Ct. at 2111.
Riback, 2008 WL 3211279, at *5.
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beards.175 The court explains here how there is no strong distinction
between allowing beards for medical purposes and allowing beards for
religion.176 Therefore, barring Riback from wearing a beard and yarmulke
would excessively entangle the government and religion because
prohibiting Riback from wearing a beard and yarmulke for religious
purposes would make it appear that the government is dismissing Judaism
and any religion that would need an exception.177 Therefore, prong two
and three of the “Lemon Test” are not satisfied and the court correctly held
that Riback’s First Amendment right was violated.178
Nevertheless, the court followed a previous ruling from the Smith case
that “the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability
on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his
religion prescribes (or proscribes).”179 The police department’s policy to
ban hats applied to all officers, “and there is no evidence that it is
motivated by religious animus.”180 Therefore, the court held it was not a
violation of the federal Constitution or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 for the police department to enforce its no headgear rule.181
Even though the court believed the rule was neutral, having a particular
rule that bars an individual from expressing his or her religious beliefs
shows an inclination against religion. The purpose of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 is to avoid discrimination against prospective
employees when employers refuse to hire an applicant to avoid
accommodating a religious practice that it could accommodate without
undue hardship.182 Here, the police department argued it would be a
hardship to accommodate the religious preferences because it would
interfere with performance and uniformity of the crew.183 However, there
are ways around yarmulkes affecting performance. For example, many
police departments and state troopers require the officers to wear hats.184
Even though this section of the office did not, the department could allow
for officers to choose to wear a hat that matches the uniform.185
Riback also demonstrated that “race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin was a motivating factor”186 for Riback’s altercation with the police
department. This violates the purpose of Title VII because the point of the
175. Id.
176. Id. at *6.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See id.
182. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 135 S. Ct. at 2031.
183. Riback, 2008 WL 3211279, at *1.
184. See Riback, 2008 WL 3211279, at 11.
185. See id.
186. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075
(1991).
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act is to avoid religion being a motivating factor regarding hardships at
work.187 Therefore, in addition to the department not making reasonable
accommodations that would not greatly interfere with its functioning, the
motivating factor for barring the yarmulke was that religion would not be
expressed, which is a violation of the Act.188 The court’s holding in Riback
v. L.V. Metro. Police Dept. unfortunately enforces a law that overlooks an
individual’s right to religious freedom.189
D. RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS IN HOLDING CELLS AND PRISONS
The courts have also protected the religious freedom of
institutionalized individuals in prisons and holding cells.190 Congress
passed RLUIPA to “protect institutionalized persons who are unable freely
to attend their religious needs and are therefore dependent on the
government’s permission and accommodation for exercise of their
religion.”191 The purpose of RLUIPA is to prohibit “state and local
governments from imposing ‘a substantial burden on the religious exercise
of a person residing in or confined to an institution’ unless the government
demonstrates that imposing that burden ‘is the least restrictive means’ of
furthering a ‘compelling governmental interest.’”192 The term “‘institution’
includes ‘a jail, prison, or other correctional facility’ and ‘a pretrial
detention facility.’”193
In Holt v. Hobbs, the Supreme Court of the United States broadly ruled
to allow religious observance in prisons.194 A Muslim prisoner brought suit
against the Director of Arkansas Department of Correction and other
workers, in violation of RLUIPA, for the denial of the right to wear a halfinch beard.195 Nevertheless, the prison permits inmates with a diagnosed
skin condition to grow a one-quarter inch beard.196 The Magistrate ruled
that “beards compromised prison safety because they could be used to hide
contraband and because an inmate could quickly shave his beard to
disguise his identity.”197 The district court and the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit adopted the Magistrate’s ruling because the prison “had
satisfied its burden of showing that the grooming policy was the least
restrictive means of furthering its compelling security interests,” and courts
must “defer to prison officials on matters of security.”198
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See Riback, 2008 WL 3211279, at *10-11.
190. See Khatib, 639 F.3d. at 898.
191. Id. at 900.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 853 (2015).
195. Id. at 856.
196. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. at 856.
197. Id. at 857
198. Id. Even though prison officials are experts in running prisons and evaluating the
likely effects of altering prison rules, RLUIPA’s rigorous standard must still be applied. Id.
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Subsequently, Holt appealed the case to the Supreme Court.199 Hobbs
had to show that the refusal to allow the petitioner to grow a one-half inch
beard “‘(1) [was] in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) [was] the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.’”200 First, the Court held that the grooming policy
substantially burdened prisoners’ exercise of religion while failing to
further the Department’s compelling interest in preventing prisoners from
hiding contraband.201 Next, the grooming policy was not the least
restrictive means of preventing prisoners from hiding contraband or
preventing prisoners from distinguishing their identities.202 Lastly, the
grooming policy was underinclusive with respect to security risks.203 “The
Department already searches prisoners’ hair and clothing, and it
presumably examines the [one-quarter]-inch beards of inmates with
dermatological conditions.”204 Hobbs did not offer a reason why the onehalf inch beards cannot be searched for contraband, how a one-fourth-inch
beard has different effects over a one-eighth-inch beard, or why a less
restrictive means is not attainable.205
Although it is vital for fast and accurate identification of prisoners and
shaving one’s beard may interfere with identification, the policy of barring
Holt from growing his beard was a violation of RLUIPA.206 The
Department could resolve the issue of accurate identification by
photographing all the prisoners without beards and periodically
thereafter.207 “Once that is done, an inmate like petitioner could be allowed
to grow a short beard and could be photographed again when the beard
reached the [one-half-inch] limit.”208 The prison would then have a
bearded and non-bearded photograph.209 Hobbs failed to show that the
“prison system is so different from the many institutions that allow facial
hair [and] that the dual photo method cannot be employed.”210 Therefore,
in this case, the Department’s grooming policy violates RLUIPA and Holt
must be permitted to grow a beard for his religious observance.
Khatib v. County of Orange in the Ninth Circuit additionally
demonstrates a broad interpretation of the meaning of the RLUIPA

at 864.
199. Id. at 857.
200. Id. at 860.
201. Id. at 864.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 865.
204. Id. at 865 (discussing lack of contrast between prison’s current rules that permit onefourth inch beards, head hair, and clothing to be searched).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. at 865.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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statute.211 Souhair Khatib, a former detainee, sued the County of Orange
for allegedly violating RLUIPA “by requiring her to remove her headscarf,
in public, against her Muslim religious beliefs and practice,” when she was
held in a county courthouse holding facility.212 An officer ordered Khatib
to remove her headscarf.213 Having her head uncovered in front of men in
public “is a ‘serious breach of [Khatib’s] faith and a deeply humiliating and
defiling experience.’”214 Even though she explained to the officers that her
religious beliefs mandated that she wear a headscarf and begged to keep it
on, the officers said either she must take it off or they would.215 Khatib
took it off, but experienced extreme “‘discomfort,’ ‘distress,’ and
‘humiliat[ion].’”216 The issue considered was “whether the Orange County
Santa Ana Courthouse holding facility, where . . . individuals are detained
in connection with court proceedings, is an ‘institution’ as defined by
RLUIPA.”217
The United States District Court for the Central District of California
granted the County of Orange’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim.218 The district court believed that since Khatib’s stay at the holding
facility was temporary, unlimited religious freedom was impractical.219
RLUIPA applies to longer-term institutions, but not short-term ones.220
Khatib appealed this ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, which held that the “holding facility [at the courthouse] was
an ‘institution’ under RLUIPA” and, therefore, was protected under the
RLUIPA statute.221 The court determined that the facility was a pretrial
detention facility because it is “a facility where individuals who are not yet
convicted are held pending court proceedings.”222 The court in a 20062007 Grand Jury Report characterized the Santa Ana facility as “‘a secure
detention facility located within a court building used for the confinement
of persons.’”223
Furthermore, even though the facility is a detention facility, it also falls

211. Khatib v. County of Orange, 639 F.3d. 898, 898 (2011). See also Knight v.
Thompson, 797 F.3d 934 (11th Cir. 2015). This case also discusses how the courts rule
narrowly and bar religious freedom in prisons. A Native-American man challenged the
prison’s short-hair policy. He brought a RLUIPA case against the prison for its failure to
accommodate his religious observance. The court held that the prison was not violating
RLUIPA when it did not permit him to keep his hair long in observance of his religion.
212. Khatib, 639 F.3d at 898.
213. Id. at 901.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 900.
218. Id. at 898.
219. Id. at 901.
220. See id.
221. Khatib, 639 F.3d at 898.
222. Id. at 903.
223. Id.
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under the definition of a jail.224 “A ‘jail’ is a ‘building for the confinement
of persons held in lawful custody.”225 It would fulfill this dictionary
definition of a jail because the definition of a secure detention facility “falls
squarely within the ordinary common definition of a ‘jail.’”226 Because the
Santa Ana facility falls within the RLUIPA statute, the court supported the
belief that individuals are entitled to religious freedom within public
institutions, specifically jails.227
E. RELIGIOUS RESTRICTIONS AND ACCOMMODATIONS FOR TEACHERS IN
PUBLIC SCHOOLS
In addition to prisons, the military, and workplaces, public schools
have also faced conflicting views regarding whether teachers may wear
religious garb under the First Amendment and VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. Some courts have ruled very firmly.228 In United States v. Bd. of
Educ., a teacher brought suit alleging she should be allowed to wear
religious clothing in the course of her duties.229 Alima Delores Reardon is
Muslim and believes women, when in public, must cover their entire body
except her face and hands.230 “‘She wore while teaching . . . a head scarf
which covered her head, neck, and bosom leaving her face visible and a
long loose dress which covered her arms to her wrists.’”231 Reardon taught
in this attire for many years without any issues.232 Then, she began to
substitute teach at different schools and the principals told her that
“pursuant to state law, she could not teach in her religious clothing due to
Pennsylvania’s Garb Statute.”233 The state statute provided that “no teacher
in any public school shall wear in said school or while engaged in
performance of his duty as such teacher, any dress, mark, emblem or
insignia indicating that fact that such teacher is a member or adherent of
any religious order, sect or denomination.”234
Reardon filed a complaint with the EEOC and the EEOC concluded
that the School Board and the Commonwealth had violated Title VII.235
The Department of Justice filed a complaint in the district court contending
that the Board “(1) ‘fail[ed] or refus[ed] to employ as public school
teachers individuals who wear or who seek to wear garb or dress that is an
aspect of their religious observance,’ and (2) ‘fail[ed] or refus[ed]
reasonably to accommodate individuals who wear or who seek to wear garb
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
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Id.
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or dress . . . that is an aspect of their religious observance in practice.’”236
However, because the Commonwealth “was not an ‘employer’ of Reardon
within the meaning of Title VII,” Title VII could not be enforced.237 The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
entered judgment against the School Board and ordered the Board not to
favor the Garb Statute.238
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held, in relevant part, that to
allow Ms. Reardon to wear the religious garb would have imposed undue
hardship on the school board to allow her to teach in religious garb and,
therefore, did not violate the VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.239 “For
the Board to have accommodated Ms. Reardon, it would have been
required to expose its administrators to a substantial risk of criminal
prosecution, fines, and expulsion from the profession.”240 The court agreed
with the Board that this would be an undue hardship.241 The Garb state
statute “bans all religious attire and is being enforced by the
Commonwealth in a non-discriminatory manner.”242 Therefore, the court
ruled in favor of the Board and the Commonwealth and created precedent
that teachers may not wear religious garb in public schools.243
The court’s belief that accommodating Ms. Reardon would cause
undue hardship and forgo religious neutrality ignores Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.244 The court is overly concerned about the burden that
accommodating religious freedom would place on the Board, even though
the risks the Board faces are merely possible, and fails to emphasize the
federal right individuals possess to practice or not practice a religion.245
Also, the court discusses that the state statute is neutral toward religion.246
However, barring individuals from wearing religious clothing is not neutral
and illustrates hostile feelings toward those following religions because
individuals are not allowed to practice or show any way of following a
religion in public school settings.247 Unfortunately, the Third Circuit is
setting precedent to suppress religious beliefs.248
Similarly to United States v. Bd. of Educ.,249 Cooper v. Eugene Sch.
Dist. No. 4J also discusses barring individuals from wearing religious garb
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in public schools.250 Janet Cooper, a special education teacher in the
Eugene public schools, became a Sikh and wore white clothes and a turban
while teaching the sixth and eighth grade classes.251 Ms. Cooper explained
to the staff and students of the school that she would wear the turban and
white clothing to follow the Sikhism religion.252 “She continued to wear
her white garb after being warned that she faced suspension if she violated
a law against wearing religious dress at her work.”253
The state law, ORS 342.650 declares: “No teacher in any public school
shall wear any religious dress while engaged in the performance of duties
as a teacher.”254 ORS 342.655 declares: “Any teacher violating the
provisions of ORS 342.650 shall be suspended from employment by the
district school board.255 The board shall report its action to the
Superintendent of Public Instruction who shall revoke the teacher’s
teaching certificate.”256 The school superintendent suspended Ms. Cooper
from teaching and the Superintendent of Public Instruction revoked her
teaching certificate even though she was tenured.257 The order was
challenged on constitutional grounds and the Court of Appeals “set aside
revocation of [the] teaching certificate as excessive sanction under [the]
First Amendment of the United States Constitution.”258
The
Superintendent appealed the finding to the Supreme Court of Oregon.259
The Supreme Court of Oregon held that
(1) [the] religious dress statute, when correctly interpreted, did not
violate [the] State’s guarantees of religious freedom or [the] . . .
First Amendment, and (2) revocation of [the] teaching certificate
was disqualification from teaching in public schools based upon
one’s doing so in manner incompatible with that function, rather
than ‘sanction’ by reason of hostility to religious and political
belief.260
The court declared that this was a revocation of a license issue and
should not be turned into a constitutional law issue.261 However, if the
court only concentrates on revoking a teaching license, it is missing the
major issue that caused the revocation of the license.262 It appears that the
court merely wants to take the easy way out and not address the larger
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
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matter causing the problem.263 The Supreme Court of Oregon reasoned
that when the state statute of ORS 342.650 can validly be applied, the
revocation of a teaching certificate under ORS 342.655 is not a penalty or
violation of the First Amendment of the Constitution.264 Because the
revocation “is not a withdrawal of a privilege by reason of hostility to a
religious or political belief,” and because Ms. Cooper was teaching in a
manner incompatible with the rules for public schools, the Superintendent
had a right to withdraw the license.265 However, Ms. Cooper was teaching
in a manner incompatible with the state rules because the rules barred her
freedom of religion, which is a direct violation of the federal
Constitution.266 Even though the court argued this is not a federal
Constitutional issue, when the “Lemon Test” is applied, there is an
Establishment Clause violation.267 To avoid a violation, there must be a
significant secular purpose, the action must not have the primary effect of
advancing or inhibiting religion, and it does not foster excessive
entanglement between government and religion.268
Here, there is not a strong secular purpose to bar Ms. Cooper from
wearing religious garb.269 The purpose is to maintain religious neutrality,
but by banning an individual from following his or her religion, a negative
emphasis is placed on religion and is, therefore, not neutral.270 The purpose
of barring Ms. Cooper from observing Sikhism is to suppress religious
beliefs from public schools.271 By doing so, the ruling excessively
entangles the government with religion in public schools.272 Therefore, the
judgment runs contrary to the “Lemon Test.”273 Furthermore, this court
missed the reasoning behind why a violation of the state statute occurred
and merely looked to see that a violation did occur.274 The state statute is
archaic and should not bar an individual from practicing his religion as
long as he does not impose his religious views on others.275 Consequently,
the court in Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 4J incorrectly overlooked the
violations of the federal Constitution and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 because granting the accommodation does not harm others, and
also only looked at the surface issues of revocation of a license and the
violation of the state statute.276
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CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, far too many individuals experience religious
discrimination in the military, workplace, police force, prisons, and public
schools. Courts have set narrow precedent when it comes to deciding
religious liberty, as we seen in Goldman v. Weinberger, Webb v. City of
Philadelphia, Riback v. L.V. Metro. Police Dept., Khatib v. County of
Orange, United States v. Bd. of Educ., and Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No.
4J.277 This has resulted in federal constitutional violations under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as violations under the Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and RLUIPA.278 Even though courts are
concerned about neutrality or uniformity, to deny an individual a right to
express his or her own religion when there is no definite harm to others
indicates a preference against religion.279 Hopefully, courts will broaden
their views, as they did in the Singh v. McHugh, EEOC v. Abercrombie &
Fitch, EEOC v. Autozone, J.B. Hunt Transport Services, and the Holt v.
Hobbs cases, to uphold an American’s right to freedom of religion.280
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